scope:

The sole reason for this Handbook is the development of a capability for the timely sampling and unambiguous identification of biological, mid-spectrum and chemical warfare agents in a battlefield environment or in operations other than war. The aim is to confirm their first use by the enemy and thereby support timely politico-military decisions concerning an appropriate NATO response to such actions. Although such evidence is required quickly, the proof of use of these agents must be such that it cannot be refuted (unequivocal). This degree of certainty cannot be achieved by information obtained solely from the battlefield such as detector responses or unusual casualties. Only when the battlefield information is combined with samples from the field, their history and the analytical evidence from the identification laboratory can irrefutable evidence be given to NATO leaders. It should also be taken into account that diseases caused by potential and putative biological agents could be endemic in the battlefield area. This unequivocal identification may also be subsequently required by individual nations.

However, apart from first use and a NATO response to this, agent identification will still be required in order to provide tactical information to the commander in the field about the nature of the weapon he is facing including its effects and persistence. Information may be available about the performance and limitations of the defensive equipment and procedures that would allow the commander to make meaningful decisions affecting the operating posture of his units. This requirement is not treated in detail in this Handbook.

Agent identification will also be necessary to allow the medical services to provide the most appropriate treatment. Moreover, military and political authorities will be required to take effective counter-measures to prevent outbreaks of infectious diseases and intoxications caused by transmissible biological agents and toxins.

Furthermore, there will be a psychological benefit to the armed forces in knowing the nature of the weapon used that should dispel any irrational fears of the "unknown" agent and give the service personnel confidence in their equipment and training. On a wider timescale agent identification provides information upon which future threat assessment can be made and guidance for the future design of defensive equipment and procedures can be given.

However, although the response of the field detection equipment combined with medical information, can provide provisional agent identification and hence guidance on protective measures, unambiguous identification and proof of use must be obtained by using sophisticated analytical techniques in one or more well equipped and properly designed laboratories. In addition to sophisticated instrumentation and trained personnel, these laboratories must be able to handle extremely toxic chemicals and disease-causing micro-organisms which require containment laboratories and facilities with highly specialised architectural, sterilisation and ventilation features. Established identification criteria for biological, mid-spectrum and chemical agents provide the required certainty for agent identification where first use is in question.

The evidence of the proof of agent use must be such that it cannot be refuted. This implies that evidence handling procedures (see Chapter 4.6) have to be followed to guarantee that the samples are supported by unequivocal evidence such that any challenge to their authenticity can be successfully met. Whenever possible, the samples should be analysed by at least two identification laboratories with consistent results. This could either be accomplished by sending two SIBCA sampling teams to the contaminated area or transferring the original samples to one laboratory, subdividing them and transferring the subsamples to a second laboratory whilst maintaining the evidence handling procedures.

This Handbook describes general guidelines for the sampling and identification of biological, mid-spectrum and chemical agents. No detailed experimental procedures are presented. Mid-spectrum (bioregulators, toxins) are non-replicating chemical agents produced by living organisms. They are not treated separately here, but are either combined with replicating biological agents or with chemical agents in the various Chapters of this Handbook.

In order to translate the requirement for unambiguous agent identification in the case of first use into an operational reality it will be necessary for the NATO armed forces to acquire equipment for the proper collection and packaging of samples. The sampling team must be competent and with appropriate scientific training. Chapter 2 deals with the operational procedures that must be established to ensure that meaningful samples are taken, packaged and together with all available field information rapidly, safely and, under custody transported to an identification laboratory. Information, gathered by the sampling team during its mission may contribute to the decision whether the samples will be forwarded to a biological or chemical identification laboratory.

Where subsequent operations are concerned, the introduction of NBC reconnaissance vehicles by several NATO Nations has demonstrated that with the improvement of instrumentation technology it is possible to put the means for provisional identification back into the battlefield. At their present stage of development, when using these mobile detection and identification systems there often remains a requirement to forward samples to a laboratory for confirmative analysis. These systems use instrumentation found in identification laboratories suitably miniaturised, automated and ruggedized for field use. Chapter 3 describes the possibilities of these mobile systems which have the capability to provide immediate information on the NBC situation in the target area.

Chapter 4 reverts to SIBCA activities and discusses the reporting aspects of the sampling and identification process. There are two distinct aspects to reporting: those dealing with the information that is included with the sample during collection or the battlefield and that information that is reported by the identification laboratory to the highest levels of command within NATO. Information included with the sample is intended for the personnel in the laboratory to aid them in the identification process. The information provided by the laboratory to NATO is combined with other reports to help NATO guide on its response to the attack and to allow the commander in the field and the medical services to take the appropriate military action.

In order that a reliable identification process including sample collection, packaging and transport to the base laboratory, sample preparation and identification in the laboratory and reporting will exist in wartime it is necessary to set up training programmes for each stage or a combination of stages of the process. The training aspects are dealt with in Chapter 5. The need for training in the various technical and operational procedures for sampling, transport, identification and reporting is emphasised.

Based on information provided with the samples, they will be delivered to a biological or chemical identification laboratory. In case this information is unknown, it must be assumed that the sample contains biological agents and on arrival at the identification laboratory the samples must be placed in biological containment. In most cases agents have to be liberated from the sample matrix in which they are embedded. Methods to isolate and to characterise biological agents are discussed in Chapter 6. They are based on classical microbiological, immunological, molecular-biological and instrumental-physical techniques. The immunological techniques may also be appropriate for the identification of mid-spectrum agents.

In order to make use of the results obtained by applying identification methods in the base biological laboratory reliable reference data need to be acquired. In Chapter 7 the various possibilities to create such a database are presented. Additional work has to be accomplished in this area.

On arrival at a chemical identification laboratory samples originating from for example unexploded agent munitions may be presented to the identification techniques without further treatment. In most other cases the chemical or mid-spectrum agent has to be liberated from the matrix in which it is embedded. Methods to achieve these are discussed in Chapter 8. This Chapter also contains a description of the different chromatographic and spectrometric techniques used alone or in combination for identification of agents. Techniques applicable for chemical agents may be appropriate for the identification of mid-spectrum agents.

In order to make use of the results obtained by applying identification methods in the base chemical laboratory collections of reliable chromatographic and spectrometric data are required. Positive identification can be achieved by direct comparison of the data of the sample with those in the reference collection. In Chapter 9 the different types of chromatographic and spectrometric data and the compounds they were taken from are described. As chemical warfare agents may be chemically transformed in the environment after dispersion, data have been compiled on decomposition products as well as derivatives and compounds unintentionally formed during analysis. In addition, data on impurities found in some agents have been compiled, as their identification may indicate the synthetic route and therefore the possible origin of these agents.