scope:

This European Standard defines the fire conditions for which it is reasonable to expect trains to continue to run in a controlled manner and defines requirements which assure this "running capability". The standard recognises fire conditions for which it is not necessary to define running capability requirements as there is no potential for serious injury or threat to life. The standard recognises fire conditions for which it is not reasonably practicable to define requirements due to the exceptional nature of the fire incident. NOTE Fire conditions for which it is not reasonably practicable to define requirements due to the exceptional nature of the fire incident, (described as "Type 3" fires), will benefit from measures taken to deliver running capability under other fire conditions, (described as "Type 2" fires), but the benefit for Type 3 fires is not at a defined level. The SRT TSI defines running capability requirements in respect of fires within technical areas/equipment only. However for general guidance the scope of this standard is extended to include fires from non-technical causes within passenger/staff areas which may impact train system functions adjacent to and/or passing through the affected area. This extension of applicability significantly increases the number of system functions which are potentially at risk and therefore requires that the "reasonably practicable" principles be extended to this new condition. It is important to note that in several cases it might appear that requirements are included which are duplicating requirements given in the TS 45545 series and/or which are dealt with in other ways by the TS 45545 series. This is not the intention and is not the case. the TS 45545 series introduces running capability functional requirements but does not generally define how they are to be met nor to what level of performance. Also, a number of requirements which are included in the TS 45545 series, would be relevant to, or suitable for, running capability use but are not identified for this use within the TS. It is therefore necessary to include requirements which are apparently duplicating the TS 45545 series in this standard but which actually do not duplicate the TS when examined in detail. If desired it should be possible, when converting TS 45545 to an EN, to include these requirements during the process which would allow them to be removed from this standard. This document does not consider fires resulting from technical causes where the primary incident, e.g. major mechanical defect leading to derailment, is likely to immobilise the train by definition.