NATO - AJP-3.4.4
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERSURGENCY (COIN)
| Organization: | NATO |
| Publication Date: | 4 February 2011 |
| Status: | inactive |
| Page Count: | 156 |
scope:
Purpose
AJP-3.4.4 provides a common NATO doctrine to guide commanders, staffs and forces engaged in the conduct of COIN. It also informs civil actors involved in security and stabilisation of the full range of capabilities that the military may contribute to a joint, interagency and multinational response to the resolution of such 'wicked problems'.2
AJP-3.2 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations' provides the doctrinal underpinning for the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign theme and its relationship to the conduct of operations across the full range of military activities. AJP-3.4 'Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations' (NA5CRO) describes the considerations relevant to the successful conduct of various types of complex operations, insurgency being one of the identified irregular threats that the Alliance has to counter.
This document aims to inform and guide the planning and conduct of NATO counterinsurgency. It is based on the assumption that a decision to launch NATO or NATO-led operations involving COIN will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law. It is also based upon the assumption that the conduct of COIN operations will have to conform to relevant international law. Any provisions, definitions or obligations in this AJP may not be interpreted or construed as state practice or a change in effective agreements on the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
All statements and terminology regarding an insurgency and its organisational and operational patterns are not intended to convey any legal connotation or combatant status, but rather assist NATO commanders and staffs in understanding and describing their operational environment and planning and executing COIN operations.
This document does not address such insurgencies as may occur within the territory of any NATO member state. It is fully understood that such situations will be governed by the affected state's domestic law.
2 A wicked problem is one that is difficult to resolve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognise and predict. When solving one aspect of a problem complex interdependencies may manifest themselves in unintended consequences. Rittel, Horst, and Melvin Webber; "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," pp. 155-169, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4.
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