IETF RFC 8750
Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
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| Organization: | IETF |
| Publication Date: | 1 March 2020 |
| Status: | active |
| Page Count: | 8 |
scope:
Abstract
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined at the time this document was written. When used with IPsec, some algorithms, such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids sending the IV itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how to do this.
Document History
IETF RFC 8750
March 1, 2020
Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Abstract
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms...