IEEE 323
Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
Organization: | IEEE |
Publication Date: | 11 September 2003 |
Status: | active |
Page Count: | 28 |
scope:
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(This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 323-2003, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.)
IEEE Std 323-2003, a revision of IEEE Std 323-1983, is the result of a review of IEEE Std 323-1983 and present practices in equipment qualification. This revision incorporates current practices and lessons learned from the implementation of previous versions of this standard by the nuclear industry.
Several issues are clarified or changed in this revision:
- This standard defines the methods for equipment qualification when it is desired to qualify equipment for the applications and the environments to which it may be exposed. This standard is generally utilized for qualification of Class 1E (safety-related electric) equipment located in harsh environments, and for certain post-accident monitoring equipment, but it may also be utilized for the qualification of equipment in mild environments. The documentation requirements are, however, more rigorous for equipment located in a harsh environment.
- The term design basis event has been generally used instead of the acronyms DBE, DBA, LOCA, and HELB, and the term design basis accident in order to reduce the complexity of the text.
- Seismic events are identified as design basis events.
- The test margins have been updated to better identify the parameters that achieve test margin on design basis event profiles. Since quantitative margin can be adequately identified by increases in temperature, pressure, radiation, and operating time, the performance of two transients is no longer recommended.
- New digital systems and new advanced analog systems may require susceptibility testing for EMI/ RFI and power surges, if the environments are significant to the equipment being qualified. Since existing instrument and control (I&C) systems were less vulnerable and have the benefit of successful operation under nuclear power plant EMI/RFI and power surge environments, qualification to EMI/RFI and power surges was not previously significant enough to be considered in environmental equipment qualification. As existing I&C equipment in nuclear power plants may be replaced with computer-based digital I&C systems or advanced analog systems, these new technologies may exhibit greater vulnerability to the nuclear power plant EMI/RFI and power surges environments. Documents such as NUREG/CR-5700-1992 [B32], a NUREG/CR-5904-1994 [B33], NUREG/CR- 6384-1996, Volumes 1 and 2 ([B34], [B35]), NUREG/CR-6406-1996 [B36], NUREG/CR-6579- 1998 [37], and NRC IN 94-20 [B31] have documented the environmental influence of EMI/RFI and power surges on safety-related electric equipment. Guidelines for ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of safety systems can be found in IEEE Std 603 ™ -1998 and IEEE Std 7-4.3.2 ™ -2003. b
- An important concept in equipment qualification is the recognition that significant degradation could be caused by aging mechanisms occurring from the environments during the service life, and therefore safety-related electric equipment should be in a state of degradation prior to imposing design basis event simulations. Previous versions recognized that the period of time for which acceptable performance was demonstrated is the qualified life. The concept of qualified life continues in this revision. This revision also recognizes that the condition of the equipment for which acceptable performance was demonstrated is the qualified condition. Thus, new license renewal and life extension options are available by assuring that qualified equipment continues to remain in a qualified condition.
Industry research in the area of equipment qualification and decades of its application have greatly benefited this standard. Future activities of the working group to update this standard will consider the following:
- Risk-informed approaches and impact of condition monitoring, performance, safety function assessment, and qualified life precision.
- Significance of refinements in aging mechanisms, equipment sealing, interfaces, extrapolation, similarity, test sequence and parameters (such as ramp rates, time duration, timing of spray initiation and its duration), and qualification documentation.
Participants
This standard was prepared by Working Group (SC 2.1) of the Subcommittee on Qualification (SC 2) of the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society. At the time of completion, SC 2.1 had the following membership:
James F. Gleason, Chair
At the time this revised standard was completed, the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee/Subcommitt
Satish K. Aggarwal, Chair
Satish K. Aggarwal
Anup K. Behera
Thomas Brewington
Nissen M. Burstein
Mike Dougherty
Quang H. Duong
Wells D. Fargo
Artur J. Faya
Christopher M. Gleason
Patrick Gove
Tom Hencey
Jerrell C. Henley
David A. Horvath
Serena A. Jagtiani-Krause
Sushant Kapur
Byung-Ryung Koh
Henry Leung
Robert J. Lofaro
Bruce M. Lory
Edward Mohtashemi
Nathalie Nadeau
Paul Shemanski
John Wheless
John White
Michael J. Wylie
Javier Alonso
Bohumil Bartonicek
P. D. Baughman
Anup K. Behera
Brij Bharteey
Thomas Brewington
Candace Brooks
Rufus A. Brown
Nissen M. Burstein
Craig R. Butcher
Steve Casadevall
Garry V. Chapman
Marty Chipkin
Jeff Chivers
Sun Y. Choi
James M. Dean
Liviu N. Delcea
Dennis E. Dellinger
Phillip DiBenedetto
Quang H. Doung
Frank Drumm
Jeffrey S. Esterman
Keith Evans
Wells D. Fargo
Artur J. Faya
Robert Francis
James F. Gleason
Patrick Gove
William L. Hadovski
Peter Helander
Jerrell C. Henley
Thomas R. Henry, III
David A. Horvath
Craig S. Irish
Serena A. Jagtiani-Krause
Sushant Kapur
Mohsin Khan
Gene R. Kopecky
Jacob M. Kulangara
Thoma Kurt
Henry Leung
Victor Loczi
Robert J. Lofaro
Bruce M. Lory
Darin R. Martin
Wolfgang Michel
Todd Milton
Edward Mohtashemi
Carole Monchy-Leroy
Bill Newell
James Parello
Janez Pavsek
Daniel J. Pomerening
John M. Richards
Zoltan R. Rosztoczy
Fred Roy
Steve Sandberg
Glen E. Schinzel
Roderick Simms
Kjell Spang
Richard G. Starck
Marek Tengler
Gary Toman
Marco Van Uffelen
Laszlo Varga
Carl Weber
John Wheless
John White
Richard T. Woods
Toshio Yamamoto
The following members of the balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 11 September 2003, it had the following membership:
Don Wright, Chair
Howard M. Frazier, Vice Chair
Judith Gorman, Secretary
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Alan Cookson, NIST Representative
Satish K. Aggarwal, NRC Representative
Savoula Amanatidis
IEEE Standards Managing Editor
Scope
This standard describes the basic requirements for qualifying Class 1E equipment and interfaces that are to be used in nuclear power generating stations. The principles, methods, and procedures described are intended to be used for qualifying equipment, maintaining and extending qualification, and updating qualification, as required, if the equipment is modified. The qualification requirements in this standard, when met, demonstrate and document the ability of equipment to perform safety function(s) under applicable service conditions including design basis events, reducing the risk of common-cause equipment failure. This standard does not provide environmental stress levels and performance requirements.
NOTE-Other IEEE standards that present qualification methods for specific equipment, specific environments, or specific parts of the qualification program may be used to supplement this standard, as applicable. Annex A lists other standards related to equipment qualification.