ISA TR84.00.02
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verification of Safety Instrumented Functions
| Organization: | ISA |
| Publication Date: | 8 September 2015 |
| Status: | active |
| Page Count: | 138 |
scope:
ISA-TR84.00.02-2015 is informative and does not contain any mandatory clauses. ISA-TR84.00.02 is intended for use by those with a thorough understanding of ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 1. This document assumes that a SIS is required. It does not provide guidance on the hazard and risk assessment used to identify the need for a SIS. The user is referred to ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 3, and CCPS's Hazard Evaluation Procedures and Layers of Protection Analysis:Simplified Risk Assessment for guidance on assigning the SIL.
Prior to proceeding with use of ISA-TR84.00.02-2015,
At least one SIF is required
The functional requirements of the SIF
The integrity requirements of the SIF
ISA-TR84.00.02-2015 provides guidance on different issues that impact SIL verification:
Assessing random and systematic failures, classifying failure modes, and estimating the failure rates for individual devices of an SIF;
Assessing the impact of diagnostic and mechanical integrity choices on the performance of the SIF and its devices;
Assessing and estimating the potential for common cause and common mode failures; and Verifying that the SIF achieves a specified SIL and spurious trip rate.
ISA-TR84.00.02 provides guidance on techniques for evaluating the following:
Average probability of failure on demand for low demand mode Spurious trip rate
There are four topics that are being held until the next revision of ISA-TR84.00.02. Until then, the reader should refer to ISO 12489 for appropriate methodologies.
- Modeling of continuous and high demand mode systems
- Understanding proof test effectiveness and how this is addressed by design and mechanical integrity practices
- Understanding how to model common cause and systematic contribution to the failure of subsystems and systems and to the occurrence of the hazardous event
- Expanding the discussion of common cause and systematic error to address these issues across the entire lifecycle
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